International Journal of Legal Information
the Official Journal of the International Association of Law Libraries
Volume 35
Issue 2 The New Russia: Law and Legal Information
(Summer 2007)

Article 9

7-1-2007

Federalism and Elections in the Russian
Federation: National and Regional Aspects
Sergey D. Knyazev
Department of State and Administrative Law, Far Eastern National University

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/ijli
The International Journal of Legal Information is produced by The International Association of Law
Libraries.
Recommended Citation
Knyazev, Sergey D. (2007) "Federalism and Elections in the Russian Federation: National and Regional Aspects," International Journal
of Legal Information: Vol. 35: Iss. 2, Article 9.
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/ijli/vol35/iss2/9

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in International Journal of Legal Information by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more
information, please contact jmp8@cornell.edu.

Federalism and Elections in the Russian Federation:
National and Regional Aspects
SERGEY D. KNYAZEV∗
Russian constitutional principles setting out a federal system and a
republican form of government are integral attributes of Russian nationality.
It makes it necessary to create an adequate blend of federalism and electoral
politics. Accordingly, there is a special interest in the problem of electoral
federalism. It implies, together with provisions for the unity of the Russian
Federation’s electoral system, fundamental principles, and real opportunities
for the subjects of the Federation to independently solve problems on
organizing and holding elections in their territories. At least, such an approach
correlates to federalism and elections at the national and regional levels and is
declared in the articles of the Constitution of the Russian Federation as well as
decisions of the Russian Constitutional Court.
From the moment of its establishment, the Constitutional Court of the
Russian Federation has continually worked on the problem of elections and
election legislation. One way to understand the legal and constitutional nature
of Russian electoral federalism can be found in the constitution’s provisions
and definitions directly related to the organization of state power, the
formation of the Russian electoral system, as well as various aspects of
organizing and holding elections.
1

The most important idea here is that the Russian Constitution
contains neither a complete list of state power in individual regions, nor
limitations of powers except by the higher federal authorities for the purpose
of forming a system of regional state power and establishing the parameters of
an electoral system throughout the federated regions of Russia.
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1
In this regard, we should consider the Russian Federation Constitutional Court’s
provision of January 24, 1997 № 1-П on the constitutionality of Udmurt Republic
Law of April 17, 1996, “On the System of State Power Authorities in the Udmurt
Republic.”
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As a result, subjects of the Russian Federation, within the framework
of forming (fixing) their own constitutional legal status, are authorized in the
texts of their constitutions (charters) to envisage the formation of state power
authorities not only at the regional level but in particular cities and regions. In
this context, state power authorities, being formed at the level of cities and
regions, in accordance with their status and competence, as well as character
of formation, functioning and interacting with higher authorities, must
correspond to the fundamentals of the Russian Federation constitutional
regime. As a result, principles of democracy and decentralization are the
basis for organizing local public authority, whether carried out by the local
state power authorities or municipal authorities.2
Speaking about the Constitutional Court’s recognition of electoral
independence of the Russian federated regions, one should consider the Act
adopted on November 29, 2004 № 17-П, which concerns verifying the
constitutionality of the first abstract of Clause 4, Article 64 of Leningradskaya
Oblast Law, “On Elections of Deputies of the Representative Authorities and
Officials of the Local Self-Government in Leningradskaya Oblast” due to the
claim of V.I. Gnezdilov and S.V. Pashigorov. In the applicants’ opinion, the
electoral legislation of Leningradskaya Oblast must not set a special
regulation for recognizing municipal elections to be held, as it contradicts the
Constitution of the Russian Federation and means illegal interference of
Oblast into the Russian Federation authority. However, the Constitutional
Court disagreed with them, pointing out that federal electoral legislation does
not set the rules for determining the winners of municipal elections. Setting
regulations for recognizing a candidate to be elected for the position in the
municipal self-government authorities does not concern the basic guarantees
of the Russian citizens’ electoral rights. As a result, it is not an exclusive
prerogative of federal legislators. According to the fundamentals of the
Russian Federation’s electoral system, the subjects of the Federation are
authorized to consider the rules for recognizing municipal elections if they do
not contradict the constitutional principle of equality while exercising
electoral rights by the citizens.3
The above-mentioned example is a clear example of the Russian
Federation Constitutional Court gradually taking the position that when a
body organizing and holding elections, including issues of the legal regulation
of the Russian citizens’ electoral rights, the body itself and the issue in
question are simultaneously under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation
2
3

Collection of the Russian Federation Legislation. 1997. № 5. Art. 708.
Collection of the Russian Federation Legislation. 2004. № 49. Art. 4948.
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and its subjects. Electoral federalism is one of the fundamental principles of
the national electoral system’s formation and functioning, together under the
direct authority of the Russian Constitution’s establishment of the state power
organization.
At the same time, recent efforts on strengthening the vertical structure
of state power and the present electoral legal practices show that the adequate
combination of federalism and elections faces considerable difficulties. The
result is the obvious strengthening of the federal center to the detriment of
regional independence, at least in the sphere of electoral relations. To prove
this, we just need to observe the interests of the Federation and its subjects
while considering the types of elections and whether they are allowed at
various levels. One can also consider electoral systems and the peculiarities
of their application at the federal, regional, and municipal levels, as well as
system of election commissions responsible for organizing and administering
elections.
Regarding the types of elections and whether they are permitted at
various levels of public power, we should note that the Russian Constitution
(Article 11) and the Federal Law, “On Basic Guarantees of Electoral Rights
and Rights to Take Part in Referendum of Citizens of the Russian
Federation,” (Clause 9, Article 2). At first blush, the law appears to stipulate
the usage of the institution of elections, while at the same time forming a
seemingly unlimited number of public power authorities and officials at all
levels (federal, regional, and municipal). It is impossible to find the direct
prohibition for holding elections with respect to any subjects of state or
municipal power. However, if we refer to other legislative acts we can easily
find direct limitations of independence of the subjects of the Russian
Federation in choosing the method of forming their own state power
authorities. Thus, Article 18 of the Federal Law, “On General Principles of
Organization of Legislative (Representative) and Executive State Power
Authorities of the Subjects of the Russian Federation,” stipulates that the
position of the head of the subject of the Russian Federation is created by
vesting an individual with appropriate power under the personal
recommendation of the Russian President.
In accordance with the existing procedure of filling vacant regional
gubernatorial positions of a region, and as a result of legal practice, The
Russian President recommends only one candidate to the regional legislature.
This serves to deprive regional parliaments of an opportunity to truly select its
own executive. Moreover, in case of a double rejection of the recommended
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candidate, the President is authorized to dismiss the regional legislature and
appoint an acting chief official for the region in question. At the same time,
the President is authorized to dismiss the chief officials of a region from their
positions at the discretion of the president. All these innovations caused a
broad response and were ambiguously received. Most lawyers considered
them as an attempt to derail federal fundamentals of Russian nationality in the
electoral sphere. This contradicts the Russian Constitution.4 However, such
opinion is exaggerated and extremely categorical.
If we refer to the foreign experience, we will find out that in the
contemporary world there are no federations using the method suggested by
the Russian legislation for taking the governor’s position (head of the subject
of federation). However, that does not mean that direct elections by
population is the only possible form of taking the governor’s position legally.
Elections are far from a universal method of forming regional
executive power in the subjects of Federation. To a greater degree, they are
typical for the USA and some Latin-American federations (Argentina, Brazil,
Mexico), where governors are really elected by citizens in accordance with
their direct majority electoral systems. As for the great bulk of federative
states, other methods used include: appointing the executive of a region by the
head of state at his will (as in India and Pakistan); or, approval by the head of
the state of a recommendation of any subject of federation authorities (as in
Australia and Canada); or, election by the subject of federation parliament (as
in Austria, Belgium, and Germany); and even inheritance of the subject of
federation leader’s post (as in Malaysia and the United Arab Emirates).5
All these illustrate that the institution of elections cannot be
considered as the preferred method of taking the position of the head of
executive power (governor) in the subjects of a federation. The constitution of
the Russian Federation also does not stipulate that the election of its
governors is the only possible method of legalizing the status of the head of
executive state power in the Russian regions. This fact was directly addressed

4

A.V. Ivanchenko, A.E. Lyubarev. RUSSIAN ELECTIONS FROM REORGANIZATION
М.: Aspekt Press, 2006. P. 192-195.
5
See, T.Ya. Habrieva. New Bill of Forming State Duma and Executive Power
Authorities of the Subjects of the Russian Federation (Contemporary Analysis of the
Russian and Foreign Experience)// JOURNAL OF THE RUSSIAN LAW. 2004. № 11. P. 310.
TO FOREIGN DEMOCRACY.
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by the Russian Constitutional Court in its resolution of December 21, 2005
№13-П.6
Recognizing the institution of investiture (authorization) of governors
of Krai, Oblast and other subjects of the Russian Federation, the
Constitutional Court specified several legal positions. First, for the purpose of
balancing such fundamentals of Russian nationality as democracy,
sovereignty, state entity and federalism the Constitution of the Russian
Federation assumes the possibility of various methods of empowering public
officials, not directly enumerated in the Constitution as the elected ones,
which concerns the position of the governor of the subject of Federation.
Second, the possibility of changing the established procedure of empowering
public authorities and officials (including refusal to be directly elected by the
population) shall not contradict the Russian Federation Constitution if
constitutional rights and freedoms of the Russian citizens, including the right
to free elections, are observed. Thirdly, in accordance with the Russian
Constitution, the governor of the subject of the Federation is not only the head
of regional executive power, but also an element of executive power within
the unitary system in the Russian Federation. Thus, he or she is subordinated
directly to the President of the Russian Federation who, due to his
constitutional status, provides the coordinated functioning of all state power
authorities at the federal and regional level.
Taking into account these facts, the Constitutional Court made an
unambiguous conclusion that the constitutional and legal nature of the chief
executive (the president, governor, or head of administration) of a subject of
the Russian Federation the appropriate level of citizens’ empowerment
regarding direct elections by the population of the subject of the Russian
Federation. As a result, the Constitution of the Russian Federation does not
exclude the authority of the Russian President from recommending a
candidate for the position of the head of the region to the legislative authority
of the subject of the Russian Federation, as long as the final decision about
empowerment is made by the regional legislative authority.7

6

On verifying the constitutionality of particular provisions of the Federal Law,
“On General Principles of Organization of Legislative (Representative) and Executive
State Power Authorities of the Subjects of the Russian Federation,” due to the claims
of the citizens.
7
Collection of the Russian Federation Legislation. 2006. № 3. Article 336.
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We should note that the general conclusions of the Constitutional
Court about the constitutionality of not directly electing governors, which was
prompted by the federal executive, and transfer of the procedure of
authorizing the decisions of regional parliaments, under recommendation of
the Russian President. Explaining compliance of the Russian Constitution
with the new procedure of taking the position of a governor of the subject of
the Russian Federation, the Constitutional Court, simultaneously
acknowledged the constitutional legality of making elections as a method for
filling vacancies of regional chief officials. As neither Constitutional Court
nor other authorities and officials were able to assure the Russian population
that refusal to elect governors, excluding strengthening of the powerful central
government is beneficial; still, it is not clear how such a refusal coordinates
with the interests of forming democratic state, as it is obviously followed by
the reduced usage of the constitutionally guaranteed right to elect and be
elected to the state power authorities.
Despite the constitutionally guaranteed right to form state power
authorities independently, the regional subjects of the Russian Federation
have no opportunity to use elections for filling the vacant position of a
governor. If we add that the “appointed” governors have the opportunity, in
their turn, practically to “appoint” half of the Federation Assembly members
(the upper chamber of the Russian parliament), then we can understand that in
the present situation regional electoral authority was sacrificed to Russia’s
central government, strengthening that entity, and ostensibly creating unity,
even at the cost of damaging Russia’s electoral federalism.
The participation of citizens in municipal elections is not better. And
this is despite the fact that Federal Law of October 6, 2003, “On General
Principles of Organizing Local Self-Government in the Russian Federation,”
greatly extended opportunities for using elections for forming local selfgovernment authorities. This can be seen by establishing a dual system of
municipal formations, comprised on the one side of urban districts and
municipal areas, and on the other side by urban and rural settlements. As a
result, the number of municipalities with their local self-government
authorities has been greatly increased, including those which must be formed
by direct popular elections. This is an important consideration, as according to
Article 23 of the above-mentioned Federal Law, municipal elections must
take place in all municipalities in order to elect deputies as well as members

2007]

SERGEY D. KNYAZEV

239

of the elected local self-government authority on the basis of an equal and
direct electoral right by ballot.8
One should also mention that, in accordance with the Articles 35, 36
and 38 of the Federal Law, “On General Principles of Organizing Local SelfGovernment in the Russian Federation,” citizens received the right to elect
and be elected not only to the representative authority of the municipality, but
also to the municipal supervisory body (monitoring audit chamber, auditing
committee) if the charter of the municipality implies it in the structure of local
self-government authorities. It seems that such legislator’s approach does not
imply any issues related to the refusal of elections as the method for forming
public municipal power and the restriction of citizens’ electoral rights.
If we refer to such a municipal formation as a municipal region, we
will discover that in accordance with Article 35 of the Federal Law, “On
General Principles of Organizing Local Self-Government in the Russian
Federation,” its representative authority can be elected not just by the local
population, but by a combination of the heads of settlements within the
municipal region and deputies of representative authorities of the mentioned
settlements, elected from their list. Federal legislation does not prohibit taking
the position of the head of a municipal region by representative elections from
its members, but not by direct population elections. Thus, at the municipal
level, a deficiency of electoral local self-government authorities, elected by
citizens on the basis of the constitutionally guaranteed right to elect and be
elected to the authorities of state power and local self-government, is allowed.
There is no need to prove that this directly contradicts Article 30 of
the Constitution, which stipulates that local self-government is implemented
by citizens by referendum, elections and other forms of direct will via
electoral and other local self-government authority. Refusal to directly elect
local self-government authorities in the municipal regions leads to the
8

As a result, on the territory of the Primorsky Region, instead of 34 municipal
formations took place before adoption of Federal Law of October 6, 2003. “On
General Principles of Organizing Local Self-Government in the Russian Federation,”
178 municipalities, including 22 municipal regions, 12 urban districts, 116 rural and
29 urban settlements, were established. The number of municipal deputy corps was
inconsiderable, having taken place before the reform, and was replaced by over two
thousand local “parliamentaries.” According to the charters of the municipal
formations, they total 2051 persons, 137 of them work professionally in the
representative authorities.
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situation when some categories of citizens are practically deprived of the right
to elect and be elected to the local self-government authorities. This especially
concerns populations of small settlements with less than 100 voters, as,
according to the law, they are taken off the municipal elections not only at the
municipal level, but also at the level of an appropriate urban or rural
settlement.9 All these facts lead to the conclusion that at the local selfgovernment level judicial prerequisites for displacing the institution of
municipal elections by alternative methods of forming corps of municipal
power subjects are being created, which, in its turn, causes a constriction of
Russians’ electoral rights at the local self-government level.
According to the Russian Constitution, electoral legislation, though it
is not directly named in the constitutional text, is within the joint authority of
the Russian Federation and its subjects. It is proved by the Article 1 of the
Federal Law, “On Basic Guarantees of Electoral Rights and Rights to Take
Part in Referendum of the Citizens of the Russian Federation,” which
stipulates that the structure of electoral legislation is represented by federal
laws, laws of the subjects of the Russian Federation and even charters of
municipalities. Moreover, analysis of the Russian Constitution shows that a
determination of the procedure of holding elections in the federal state power
authorities, fixation of principles of electoral right, and the declaration of
electoral rights of citizens and fixation of federal guarantees are prerogatives
of the federal government in terms of legislative regulation of elections. Other
issues of legal support of organizing and holding elections can be solved by
the subjects of the Federation at their will.
However, Federal Law, “On Basic Guarantees of Electoral Rights and
Rights to Take Part in Referendum of the Citizens of the Russian Federation,”
stipulates that the federal legislature essentially monopolizes the right to
legislate in the sphere of elections. Actually, the list of election powers
reserved to the subjects of the Federation is infinitesimal, and we can talk
about regional legislation on elections and its small role in the structure of
contemporary Russian legislation with great casualty (exaggeration).
In the juridical literature we frequently see that the content of federal
electoral legislation and, particularly, the Federal Law, “On Basic Guarantees
9

According to the Article 35 of the Federal Law, “On General Principles of
Organizing Local Self-Government in the Russian Federation,” the representative
authority of the settlement is not formed if the number of voters is less than 100
persons. In this case, competence of the representative authority, including possible
election of the head of settlement, is carried out by the meeting of citizens.
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of the Electoral Rights and Rights to Take Part in Referenda of the Citizens of
the Russian Federation,” is limited through regulation.10 Otherwise, the
intrusion of federal legislation in resolving problems of electoral privileges of
the subjects of the Russian Federation would contradict the Russian
Constitution.
From the position of the existing electoral legislation we can conclude
that the Federal Law, “On Basic Guarantees of Electoral Rights and Rights to
Take Part in Referendum of the Citizens of the Russian Federation,” can play
the role of an electoral code. There, practically every important issue related
to organizing and holding elections at all levels of state power are determined.
In this regard, it is symbolic that if there is no electoral legislation (or its
recognition by the court to be invalid or inapplicable), elections in the subjects
of the Russian Federation state power authorities or local self-government
authorities must be held by the appropriate election commission on the basis
of federal law providing the exercise of citizens’ right to elect and be elected
to the state power and local self-government authorities. If the present legal
basis in the federal law is insufficient, then, in the portion not regulated by
federal law, holding such elections can take place on the basis of a
Presidential edict. Thus, at the level of federal law it was actually recognized
that the existence of legislative acts of the subjects of the Russian Federation
in the structure of electoral legislation is not a mandatory condition for legal
regulation of elections.
Transferring total control of elections and establishing legal
procedures for exercising electoral rights at the federal level does not meet the
requirements of the Constitution nor the interests of evolving Russian
federalism.11 No theory about unification of electoral procedures, which are
undoubtedly necessary, should be an excuse for the absolute universality of
electoral legislation. Meeting the requirements of international electoral
standards, an approach must take place in regard to deciding the main features
of an electoral system. As for the regulation of the detailed procedure of
elections, the subjects of the Russian Federation must keep the
constitutionally guaranteed distribution of authority between themselves and
Russia’s central government. They must retain their right to search for and
10

P.A. Astafichev. Problems of Developing Electoral Legislation in the Russian
Federation. Synopsis of a Thesis. Cand. Sc. (Philosophy). Saratov, 1998 . P. 18.
11
D.B. Sergeev. ELECTORAL RIGHTS OF THE SUBJECTS OF THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION. THEORETICAL AND LEGAL RESEARCH. Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky: Far
Eastern National University Press, 2003. P. 86-90.
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legislate their own variants for organizing and holding regional and municipal
elections on their territory.
As for the electoral system and the right to choose any of its variants,
despite the provision of practically unlimited freedom for regional activity in
this sphere, nowadays, federal legislation practically does not provide subjects
of the Federation with such an opportunity. In accordance with Article 4 of
Federal Law, “On General Issues of Organization of Legislative
(Representative) and Executive State Power Authorities of the Subjects of the
Russian Federation,” and Article 35 of the Federal Law, “On Basic
Guarantees of Electoral Rights and Rights to Take Part in Referendum of the
Citizens of the Russian Federation,” no less than half of the deputy mandates
in regional parliaments shall be distributed by the proportional electoral
system. Thus, practically all subjects of the Russian Federation have been
forced to transfer the mixed majority-proportional electoral system, though
recently it has only been used in some of them (such as Krasnoyarsky Krai,
Sverdlovskaya Oblast, and a few others).12 And if at the beginning of forming
the Russian electoral system, using any variants of its configuration at all
levels of public power was justifiably considered as one of the principles of
national electoral law,13 nowadays, opportunities for regional identity of the
Russian regions in this sphere are greatly limited.
Such a limitation of electoral purview of the subjects of the
Federation leads to the fact that even regarding municipal formations
12

The only exclusion from the general rule at present is the Dagestan Republic,
Moskovskaya Oblast and St. Petersburg City, where distribution of all deputy
mandates in the executive state power authority is based on the proportional electoral
system.
13
Indirect confirmation can be founding the definitions of the Russian Federation
Constitutional Court of November 20, 1995 № 77-П about the refusal to consider the
application of the deputies of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly and application
of the Russian Federation Supreme Court about verifying constitutionality of some
provisions of the Federal Law of June 21, 1995, “On the Election of Deputies of the
State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation.” There, the
Constitutional Court specified that stipulation of electoral procedures does not take
place in the texts of constitutions, but by legislation, making the choice of any variant
of the electoral system and its fixation in the law to depend on certain social and
political conditions and be the issue of political viability. Thus, with constitutional
jurisdiction it was officially recognized that the Russian Constitution implies the
opportunity to hold elections by various electoral systems depending on the will of
legislators. See. Collection of Legislation of the Russian Federation. 1995. № 49. Art.
4867.
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(compared to the subjects of Federation) there are more reasons to consider
their independent choice of an electoral system. At least, in accordance with
Article 32 of the Federal Law “On General Principles of Organizing Local
Self-Government in the Russian Federation,” municipalities have the right to
choose their own electoral systems. And though this right is not absolute and
depends on the appropriate law for holding municipal elections of the regional
set of electoral systems, we can see that federal legislation on elections of
local self-government authorities and officials does not have any mandatory
directives fixing universal parameters of electoral system for each municipal
formation.
It should be noted that recently there has been a tendency for more
unification of the principle fundamentals and details of electoral systems at all
levels of public power. Thus, the practice of holding elections more obviously
takes the features of “unitarism,” eloquently witnessing the virtual character
of Russian federalism, in the electoral sphere. Striking confirmation can be
seen in the December 2006 provisions of federal electoral legislation,
stipulating that it is impermissible during any elections in the Russian
Federation to vote against all candidates (or against all lists of candidates).
There is also a mandatory level of the voters’ attendance as a condition for
recognizing elections to take place.
Forming a system of election commissions as independent authorities
providing organization and holding elections also implies the necessity of
adequate voter registration. This requires a certain level of independence
necessary for the subjects of the Russian Federation to form election
commissions at the regional level. However, rules (procedures) of appropriate
members of election commissions and, particularly, procedures for taking the
position of a chairman of the commission, practically, suspend subjects of the
Federation from the process of forming regional election commissions. This
resulted in the system of election commissions turning from the ordered
collection of (relatively) independent federal, regional and municipal links
into the centralized electoral system.14 As a result, activities of the subjects of
the Federation’s election commissions are mostly focused on the Central
Election Commission of the Russian Federation. This does not contribute to
sustaining real federalism of the Russian electoral system.

14

S.D. Knyazev. System of Election Commissions. Do We Need an Electoral
Vertical?// ACADEMIC JURIDICAL JOURNAL. 2002. № 1. P. 34-38.
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In this regard, it is important to stress that an election is not only a
procedure regulated by legal provision which helps to form the corps of
deputies and heads of municipal executive power, but also an exclusive
political and legal mechanism showing, like a litmus test, the whole spectrum
of moods, tastes, and interests of various social strata and population groups.
To give the electoral process real political context, it must meet particular
requirements providing legitimacy to form representative fundamentals of
sovereignty and exclude direct state interference in the expression of the
voters’ will through election results. And this is possible, as noted in legal
literature, only in cases where organizing and holding elections, national
sovereignty is not replaced by state sovereignty. The results of elections must
not be a transfer (loss) of the voters’ (people) sovereign power, but the
election of representative authorities of state and municipal power.15 In the
electoral environment focused on the monopolistic state control of elections
via the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation and various
subordinate election commissions in the Russian Federation, there is a
serious danger that the national electoral system will turn into a convenient
institution of electoral reproduction, serving competing interests, and
challenging fundamentals of representative sovereignty.
To summarize, we should point out that federalism and elections are
undoubtedly recognized and declared by the Russian Constitution as
fundamental to the Russian political landscape. However, constitutional
declaration of federalism itself, as well as a stated commitment to the electoral
process, does not automatically guarantee electoral federalism in reality, but
implies insistent efforts of the central government and regional governments
to use the advantages of federalism and elections. Otherwise, as it often
happens in the contemporary Russian political environment, Russian citizens
will be forced to have a unitary model of elections, while at the same time
having a constitutionally recognized system of electoral federalism.

15

M.G. Pryahin. Lenin’s Ideas about Elections and Electoral Rights. Synopsis
of a Thesis. Cand. Sc. (Law). Saratov, 1973. P.11-14.

